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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE
CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES N.
TUCKER,

Case Nos.

16147, 16040,
and 16019

Defendant-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES N. TUCKER,
were convicted as charged of the offense of Aiding Escape,
and Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
Judge presiding.
This brief is intended to apply to Appellants KENNETH
SHARP, GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES N. TUCKER, and treats
the conviction of the crime of Theft of an Operable Motor
Vehicle, pursuant to §76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended) .
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were sentenced to prison for the term as
provided by law for both charges, which sentences were to
run concurrently, after a jury found them guilty of the
offenses of Escape, Appellant TUCKER; Aiding Escape,
Appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN; and Theft of an Operable
Motor Vehicle, all Appellants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered on
both counts, or in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEME!H OF THE FACTS
At the trial in the above entitled matter, Glenn
Hudson, a Records Identification Officer at the Utah State
Prison, testified regarding the status of the three appellants
in the above entitled action on the date of April 19, 1979.
After laying a foundation regarding the records that he had
in his possession, State's Exhibit 2-S

was admitted which

showed that the appellant JAMES N. TUCKER had been committed
to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as
provided by law for a crime of Rape, of not less than one nor
more than fifteen years.

Also admitted were records

purporting to be an order for a 90-day evaluation for the
appellant KENNETH SHARP (State's Exhibit 5-S), and a similar
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-2OCR, may contain errors.

order for the appellant GEORGE CHRISTENSEN (State's Exhibit

6-S).
On the face of the above documents it appeared that
the appellant JAMES N. TUCKER was incarcerated at the Utah
State Prison pursuant to a valid commitment while the
appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN were in the Utah State
Prison only for the purposes of testing and evaluation.
Paul Christensen testified that on the 18th day of
April, 1978, he was employed at the Utah State Prison and
that he knew all three of the appellants.

(R. 205)

Mr. Christensen testified that on the day in question he
had taken the three appellants out to work in an area of the
farm on the Utah State Prison grounds.

Some hour and a

half later, he returned to discover two shovels together
in one portion of the ditch, and a third shovel at the
other end of the field.

(R. 220)

Mr. Christensen then reported the three appellants
missing. He further testified that some time later he was
called to an area in Butterfield Canyon where he made an
identification of two of the appellants, SHARP and
CHRISTENSEN.
Eleanor Collard testified for the State that on the
19th day

of April, 1978, she was employed and on duty for

Riverton City.

She further testified that around 3:00 in

the afternoon she had an occassion to see three young men
walking down the street side by side.

(R. 231)

Darlene
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was working at Save More Television at approximately
12600 South on Redwood Road.

(R. 238)

She further

testified that on that day at approximately 2:45 she
observed three males in front of the windows in the store.
(R. 240)

Marsha Ruark testified that on April 19th, 1978,

she was also at Save More Television and that she arrived
there between 1:00 and 1:30 in the afternoon in a
white 1971 Cadillac.

Some time between 2:30 and 3:00

she observed a person walk briefly into the store and
shortly thereafter, she heard an engine start.

She ran

to the front door and looked out to observe her car
being driven away.

(R. 249)

Marsha Ruark further testified

that she gave no one permission to take her car from
the place where it was parked on the day in question.

Mrs.

Ruark reported the theft of her automobile to the police
authorities and Leonard Smock and Officer Whipple, among
others, left in pursuit of the vehicle.

Officer Whipple

spotted the vehicle and several officers joined in a
chase.

The Cadillac proceeded at a high rate of speed,

running cars off the road and running a stop sign in at least
one location.

(R. 289)

Several police cars pursued the

vehicle, eventually following into an
Canyon.

(R. 291)

area of Butterfield

The total distance of the chase was

approximately five miles.

(R. 299)

The appellant, JAMES

N. TUCKER, was observed by the officers to be driving the
vehicle.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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At the conclusion of the chase, the appellants SHARP
and CHRISTENSEN, passengers in the vehicle, abandoned the
vehicle, fled in one direction and were captured shortly
thereafter.

The driver, TUCKER, fled in another direction

and was subsequently apprehended in the neighboring
vicinity by a citizen in the area.

Harsha and Darlene

Ruark testified that when they had recovered the vehicle
later, the license plates had not been removed or altered,
and that the vehicle did not appear to be damaged, except
for being covered with dirt and smeared with the "dust"
that was used to test for fingerprints on the vehicle.
(R.

243, 253).
Appellant TUCKER testified under oath that on the

19th day of April, 1978, he was in the Utah State Prison
on a commitment.

He also testified that on April 19th he

was put on a work detail and he left on his own and without
any aid from the appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN.

(R. 233)

Appellant TUCKER further testified that some time later
he ran into the other two appellants in Riverton.

He said

that he had been drinking during the course of the morning
while at the prison, and that in Riverton he began to sober
up to the point where he resolved to go back to the prison.
He and appellant SHARP started to hitchhike back towards
the prison, when appellant CHRISTENSEN drove up in a 1971
Cadillac.

Appellant TUCKER testified that they then

resolved to drive around a little bit before going back to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the prison and turn themselves in.

(R.

237)

Appellant TUCKER further states that when he saw the
police he panicked and fled in the vehicle.

He ended up

driving to the Butterfield Canyon area where he was
subsequently apprehended.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GIVE TO THE JURY THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION RELATING TO THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF DEPRIVING THE
OWNER.
The appellants throughout the course of the trial
attempted to introduce evidence relating to the intention
of the defendant relative to the taking of the car.

The

owner of the car, Darlene Ruark, testified on cross
examination that there was no

damage done to the car

other than that it was dirty and dusty, and had been
fingerprinted by the police.
counsel for one of the

(R. 243)

On cross examination,

appellants elicited from the

daughter of the owner of the vehicle testimony that the
vehicle was in no way damaged, that the license plate
hadn't been altered, that the vehicle hadn't been repainted,
and that there was no other alteration of the vehicle in
any way.

(R. 253-254)

Leonard Smock, Chief of Police of

Riverton, Utah, testified that the vehicle

was driven only
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and that he and other police officers were in pursuit
of that vehicle throughout almost all of that distance.
Police Chief Smock testified that when he reached the
vehicle that it's condition did not appear to have been
altered in any way.

(R. 300)

Counsel for the Appellant TUCKER, after having laid
a foundation regarding the police chief's expertise as a
police officer, and as having established his background
in previous escape searches, put to the witness the question
"Chief, in your experience as a police officer, are you aware
that individuals, and individuals that might escape,
would generally not keep a vehicle that they take, true?",
at which point (R. 300), to this question, the prosecution
interposed an objection which objection was sustained.
(R. 301)

After laying further foundation, counsel put

the question to the police chief again.

Counsel for the

respondent once again raised an objection which objection
was once again sustained.

(R. 301)

The Appellant TUCKER testified in his own behalf and
in behalf of the co-defendants that none of them intended
to permanently deprive the owner of the car and that they
only intended to use the car to get back to the prison
itself.

(R. 346)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Appellant TUCKER's proposed instructions Numbers
2 and 3*, Appellant properly requested the trial court
to instruct the jury on the offense of Depriving an Owner
Temporarily of his Vehicle, a violation of §41-l-109,
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

(R. 55)

This

instruction was denied as an alternative theory to Count I
of the Information by the trial court.

(R. 56)

Counsel

for all Appellants also moved to dismiss the charge of
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, at the end of the
State's case on the theory that at most,

the State had

proved the misdemeanor offense of Depriving an Owner.
(R. 329-326)

Counsel for Appellants also moved for a

Directed verdict of not guilty as to Count I, Theft of an
Operable Motor Vehicle, at the end of all of the evidence.
(R. 404-405)
court.

This motion was also denied by the trial

(R. 406)

Depriving an owner is a necessarily included

offense

of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle; consequently, the
court's failure to instruct the jury on Depriving an Owner

* These

same instructions were submitted by Appellants
CHRISTENSEN (R. 70-71) and SHARP (R- 86-87).
Counsel for
appellants requested both Instructions 2 and 3 in writing
and took exception to the trial court's failure to give such
requests to the jury, properly preserving this issue on
appeal.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule Sl.
State v.
Erickson, Utah, 568 P.2d 750 (1971); State v. Bell, 563 P.2d
186 (1977); and State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d 150, 405 P.2d
793 (1965).
Accord:
Rules of Practice in the District
Courts, Rule 5.4.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constituted prejudicial error and the appellants' conviction
for Theft on an Operable Motor Vehicle should be reversed
and a new trial granted.
The appellants requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on Depriving an Owner as a lesser included
offense.

(R. 55)
A. THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
HAS A RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF
THE CASE TO THE JURY IN THE INSTRUCTIONS.

It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that
an accused in a criminal action has a right to submit to
the jury his theory of the case, and that such theory,
when properly requested, should be given to the jury in
the form of written instructions.
78 U.350, P.2d 1050 (1931).

State v. Stenbeck,

In Utah, this right allows

for the presentation of instructions on all defenses
and theories, including lesser included offenses, when such
are properly requested by the accused.

State v. Gillian,

23 U.2d 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson,
Utah, 560 P.2d 1120 (1977).
An accused may make the decision as a matter of
trial strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request
instructions on lesser included offense if his theory of
defense so dictates.

State v. Mora, Utah, 558 P.2d 1335,

1137 (1977); State v. Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 P.2d
993 (1969); State v. Valdez, 79 U.2d 426, 428, 432 P.2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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53 (1967); State v. Mitchell,
(1955).

3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618

However, when the accused as his theory of the

case requests instructions on lesser included offenses
and is willing to submit his guilt or innocence to the
jury on that theory, the trial court as a general rule
is duty bound to submit these alternatives to the trier
of the fact.

State v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 374, 375, 463 P.2d

811 (1970).
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in
effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime
as charged in the Information, but some lesser offense,
the teachings of Gillian yet apply.

On this point,

the Gillian court stated:
One of the fundamental principles
to the submission of issues to
juries is that where the parties
so request they are entitled to
have instruction given on their
theory of the case; and this
includes on lesser offenses if
any reasonable view of the evidence
would support such a verdict.
(State v. Gillian, supra,
23U.2d at 374).
In Gillian, this court pained out the reasons for
this rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness
of such a rule.

This court said it should not be the

prerogative of the trial court to direct the jury as to
what degree of crime they may find a defendant guilty or
to direct them that they must find him not guilty if they
do not find him guilty of the greater offense.

To allow

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this permits the court to be a judge of the facts and to,
in effect, direct a verdict on the lesser included offenses.
Such a procedure violates the historical spirit as well
as letter of our system on jury trial under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendmens to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of
Utah.

State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.2d (1929)

(Straup, J. concurring).

See also United States v.

Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir., 1971).
B. DEPRIVING AN OWNER IS A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN
OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE.
The test most

recently given to determine if one

offense is a lesser included offense of another is that
found in the

recently revised Utah Criminal Code.

Utah Code Annotated §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended), provides
in pertinent part:
A defendant may be convicted of
an offense included in the offense
charged, but may not be convicted
of both the offense charged and the
included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission
of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitaion, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise
included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated
by a statute as a lesser included
offense.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

This statute was recently interpreted in State v.
Lloyd, Utah, 568 P.2d 357 (1977) and its companion case,
State v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d (1977) wherein this court
held that the Utah Depriving an Owner statute is a lesser
included offense of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle.
The process by which such a determination

is made

was described in State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d
640 (1934):
The only way this matter may be
determined is by discovering
all of the elements required by
the respective sections, comparing
them and by a process of inclusion
and exclusion, determine those
common and those not common, and,
if the greater offense includes
all legal and factual elements,
it may safely be said that the
greater includes the lesser, if,
however, the lesser offense requires
the inclusion of some necessary
element or elements in order to
cover the completed offense, not
so included in the greater offense,
then it may be safely said that
the lesser is not necessarily
included in the greater.
(33 P.2d
at 645)
C. WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.
When one concedes that Depriving an Owner is a lesser
included offense of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle under
Utah's statutes, the issue then becomes when must the trial
court instruct the jury on such a lesser included offense.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The need that such an instruction be given has been
ruled to be a statutory requirement and is found in Utah
Code Annotated §77-33-6 (1953 as amended), which states:
The jury may find the defendant
guilty of any offense the commission
of which is necessarily included
in that which he is charged in
the indictment or information,
or of an attempt to commit the
offense.
This provision was expounded upon by the legislature
in the 1973 Criminal Code Revision in §76-1-402(4), which
provides:
The court shall not be
obligated to charge the jury
with respect to an included
offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant
of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included
offense.
[Emphasis Supplied]
The foregoing provision, as this court has noted,
codifies prior existing common law principles dating back
to territorial times in Utah.

People v. Robinson, 6 U.lOl,

21 P.403 (1889); State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019 (1978).
In State v. Barkas,

91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937),

this court noted that the failure to give an instruction
on lesser included offenses when requested" . . . clashes
with two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases;

It has

the effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in
effect, limiting the jury to a consideration of only part
of the evidence (the defendant's); and it, in effect, casts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-13-

upon the accused the burden of proving his innocence
or justification."

(65 P. 2d at 1132).

When the accused requests a lesser included instruction
there should exist a presumption that the requested
instruction be given. 1

Such is the tenor of this court's

discussions in the past.

In State v. Hvams, 64 U.285,

230 P.2d 349 (1924), it was stated:
It is, however, always a delicate
matter for a trial court to withhold
from the jury the right to find the
accused guilty of a lesser or included
offense, and determine the question
of the state of the evidence as
matter of law.
That should be done
onlJ in very clear cases.
(64 U.2 at
287
Accord:
State v. Barkas,
91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937).
[Emphasis Supplied]
In recent years this court has endeavored to set
specific

guidelines providing for the submission of lesser

1. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v.
Gillian, supra, 23 U.2d at 376 wherein it is said:
The usual rule on an appeal
in which the challenge is to the
sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict, is that we
review the record in the light
favorable to the jury's verdict.
However, in this situation where
the question raised relates to the
r2fusal to submit included offenses,
it is our duty to survey the whole
evidence and the inferences naturally
to be deduced therefrom to see
whether there is any reasonable
basis therein which would support
a conviction of the lesser
offenses.
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included offenses when requested.
The question that arises then when lesser included
instructions are requested is:

was there" . . . any

evidence, however slight, on any reasonable theory
under which the defendant might be convicted of the lesser
[and] included offense . .

" of Depriving an Owner.

State v. Doughtery, supra, at 177; State v. Bell, Utah,
563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977) (Justice Wilkins,concurring).
If there was such evidence, then the instructions were
properly requested and should have been submitted to
the jury for consideration.
In the instant case the appellants conceded their
presence in the vehicle.

The thrust of the defense

centered torally upon the element of his intent or mens
rea in keeping the vehicle permanently as is required by
Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
The appellant TUCKER, at trial, offered testimony which
indicated that he did not intend to keep the vehicle.
(R. 346)

Under Utah law, this defense would, if believed,

negate the specific mens rea of "intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the vehicle" required for a conviction
under the Theft statute.
To be convicted of Theft under §76-6-404, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), there must be a "purpose
to deprive" of the owner of the property.

"Purpose to

deprive" is defined in §76-6-401(3) Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended) as follows:
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(3)
"Purpose to deprive"
means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property
permanently or for so extended a period
or to use under such circumstances
that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property
only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property
under circumstances that make it unlikely
that the owner will recover it. [Emphasis Supplied]
At trial, there was no allegation of any of the above
subsections of the Utah Code.

The testimony at trial

refuted any purpose to "permanently" deprive.

Not only

did Appellant TUCKER testify to the temporary nature of
the deprivation of the vehicle, but both Darlene and
~arsha

Ruark, the owner of the vehicle and her daughter,

testitifed that there was no substantial diminishment in
value to the vehicle.

(R. 70-84)

For example, the paint

on the vehicle had not been altered (R. 75. 85), the
license plates were not removed (R. 74, 85), and the
evidence indicated no alteration to the vehicle in any
manner.
The trier of fact could have concluded that with this
specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
vehicle lacking, that appellant was guilty of depriving
an owner of his vehicle under §41-1-109 Utah Code Annotated,
(1953 as amended). as Class B Misdemeanor.
This court has ruled in the past that when the defense
theory propounded at trial is that the defendant lacks
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the appropriate mens rea and hence should be convicted
of a lesser included offense, if anything, then it is
reversible error to refuse to instruct on the lesser
included offense.

State v. Cornish, Utah, 586 P.2d 360

(1977).
In Cornish, the issue was whether the accused had
the specific intent to derpive an owner permanently of
a vehicle thus constituting the offense of Theft of an
Operable Motor Vehicle under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-401(3)
(1953 as amended) , or whether the defendant intended
to temporarily deprive

th~

owner of his vehicle thus

constituting the offense of Depriving an Owner of a
Vehicle as in the instant case.

In Cornish, the defendant

testified and said his intent was to only temporarily
deprive the owner of the vehicle, exactly as the appellant
TUCKER testified in the instant case.
that

This court ruled

the burden is clearly upon the State to prove the

mens rea element (568 P.2d at 362), and " . . . If there
is an issue of whether the prosecution has sustained this
burden, or if the defendant presents evidence under his
theory which negates the factors §76-6-401(3) (intent to
permanently deprive], - the matter of circumstances of
intent to deprive should be submitted to the trier of
fact."

(568 P. 2d at 362)

The issue in the instant case is identical to that
in Cornish.

And since the issue was properly raised by
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some evidence it should have been submitted to the
trier of fact for consideration of the lesser included
offense.

The defense evidence was that appellant's

conduct only amounted to depriving an owner, and the
jury should have had their rightful opportunity to consider
that evidence.
The failure of the trial court to instruct on the
Appellant's theory was prejudicial error mandating
reversal of their conviction as to Count I.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AS TO COUNT
ONE, THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR
VEHICLE HAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
ONLY A CONVICTION FOR DEPRIVING AN
OHNER OF A VEHICLE TEMPORARILY
UNDER §41-1-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953 as amended).
Appellants, at the end of all the evidence made a motion
for a Directed Verdict of Not Guilty on Count One of the
Information.

(R. 406)

As argued in Point I without

reiteration herein, the State failed to show under
§76-6-401(3) Utah Code Annotated,

(1953 as amended), any

purpose of Appellants to permanently deprive the owner
of the vehicle.

The evidence clearly indicated only a

temporary deprivation under §41-1-109 Utah Code Annotated,
(1953 as amended).

This statute has been determined to

be a lesser and included offense of Theft of an Operable
Motor Vehicle, as charged in Count I of the Information
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in the instant case.

State v. Cornish, Utah 568 P.2d

3601 (1977); State v. Lloyd, Utah 568 P.2d 357 (1977).
There was no evidence before the trier of fact
to show an intent to permanently deprive as required
by the Theft statute. 2
There is no substantial
evidence to support the verdict of the jury on Count I,
State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976), and the
case should be remanded to the District Court with
directions to enter a conviction and judgment for the
misdemeanor offense of Depriving an Owner under §41-1-109
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that there was no
substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact could
make a finding of guilt on Count I of the Information,
Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle.

At best, the facts

evidence an intent to "temporarily" deprive the owner of
the vehicle under §41-1-109 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended) , and a conviction and judgment on remand should
be entered accordingly.
Alternatively, Appellants submit that the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense
of Depriving an Owner of his Vehicle, as requested in
2.

See argument in Point I of this brief.
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proposed Instructions Two and Three,

was reversible

error and requires reversal of the verdict of the jury
and judgment entered thereon as to Count One, and the
instant case should be remanded to the District Court
for a new trial on that count.
Respectfully submitted,

RONALD J. YENGICH
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